Michigan Law Review
Volume 63

Issue 7

1965

The Federal Securities Act and the Locked-in Stockholder
Neil Flanagin
Member of the Illinois Bar

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Neil Flanagin, The Federal Securities Act and the Locked-in Stockholder, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1139 (1965).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol63/iss7/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT AND
THE LOCKED-IN STOCKHOLDER
Neil Flanagin*
Securities Act of 1933 1 is generally identified with Securities
and Exchange Commission registration and the attendant disclosure for primary and secondary public offerings of securities. Because of the uncertain scope of the registration requirements, however, it has the practical effect of seriously restricting certain security
holders2 in selling or dealing in their securities. Security holders so
restricted may be underwriters themselves or persons considered to
be underwriters for the particular transaction. The difficulties arise
in determining which security holders are included within this class
and which transactions by those parties are affected. It is to these
problems that the major portion of this article is devoted.8 But first,
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1. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1958), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 77b (Supp. V, 1964) [hereinafter referred to as the "Securities Act" or the
"act'1· References to sections in this and other statutes hereinafter cited are to the
original section numbers and not as designated in U.S.C. The rules and regnlations
under the act are contained in 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.100-.656 (1964).
2, Although written from the standpoint of the stockholder since the issue most
frequently arises in that context, the same considerations are generally applicable to
the holder of any security; for the purposes of this article, no distinction need be made
between kinds of securities. For the scope of the definition of "security," see§ 2(1) of the
act; Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961); SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C. M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
l!. In any proposed sale of securites by an officer, director, or the beneficial owner
of more than ten per cent of a class of equity securities, consideration should also be
given to the reporting and short-swing liability provisions of §§ 16{a) and 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-l,
as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a), 78d, 78s (Supp. V, 1964) [hereinafter referred to as the
"Exchange Act'1 as applicable to listed companies and over-the-counter companies meeting certain minimum standards of assets and public securities distribution. This subject is beyond the scope of this article; it is discussed in 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
1037-1132 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss], which is a complete and authoritative text on federal securities regulation generally, containing exhaustive citation
to authority and secondary materials. See also PRACTICING LAW INsrITUTE, SEC PROB·
LEMS OF CONTROLLING STOCKHOLDERS AND IN UNDERWRITINGS 156-82 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as P.L.I.].
The various state blue sky laws, also beyond the scope of this article, may be
applicable to sales of previously outstanding securities. The securities registration provisions of the Uniform Securities Act, §§ 301-06, require registration of sales of securities by any person unless an exemption is available (as does § 5 of the Federal Securities
Act described infra), but does not expressly extend to distributions by controlling
persons through underwriters. The exemptions contained in § 402 of the Uniform Act
exempt many, but not all, secondary distributions. See Loss & CoWETr, BLUE SKY LAw
314-23 (1958). The Uniform Act, with variations, has been adopted in eighteen states
(including Michigan, effective January 1, 1965), the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico. The act and Official Code Comment are reproduced in I BLUE SKY L. REP.
,i,i 4901-49. Loss & CoWETr, op. cit. supra, includes the foregoing and the Draftsmen's
commentary.
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by way of introduction and background, the registration scheme
under the Securities Act should be briefly outlined.

I.

THE STATUTORY SCHEME OF REGISTRATION AND EXEMPTION

Securities Act registration involves: (1) an expensive and timeconsuming process4 during which a registration statement is prepared and filed by the issuer with the SEC, examined and commented
on by the Commission's staff, amended and completed by the issuer,
and, if all goes well, ordered effective by the SEC; (2) disclosure in the
registration statement of information concerning the offering and
the issuer's financial condition, results of operations, business, property, and management; 6 (3) the delivery of a prospectus containing
most of the information in the registration statement to prospective
purchasers· of the security; 6 and (4) the imposition of liabilities upon
the issuer, underwriters, directors, and certain officers and experts
for material misstatements or omissions in the registration statement
and prospectus.7
Section 5 of the act requires registration for the sale of any security through the use of the mails or instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, 8 unless one of the exemptions, contained generally in
4. Aside from underwriting commissions or discounts, registration itself can involve
substantial expense; this expense is largely fixed and does not increase significantly
with the size of the offering. Legal, accounting, and printing costs are the major items
of cost and are rarely less than $30,000 in the aggregate and may run as high as
$100,000. See 1 Loss 370-73. The average interval between a determination of the
necessity for registration and the completion of the sale is three months. The interval
will normally be longer if the issuer has never before undergone Securities Act registration. The current work load of the SEC will have a bearing on the time lapse.
For a discussion of the SEC's examination process and its time lapse, see id. at 272-77.
5. See Schedule A to the Securities Act and Form S-1, the general form for Securities
Act registration used where none of the other forms (which relate to special types of
offerings) are authorized.
6. The registration scheme contemplates a two-step prospectus. A preliminary
prospectus, commonly called a "red herring," is distributed to underwriters, brokers,
dealers, and potential purchasers after the registration statement has been filed
but before it becomes effective. This prospectus must substantially comply with the
standards of a final prospectus (but may omit certain information such as the price,
undenvriting spread, and the identity of the undenvriters other than the managing
underwriters) and constitutes the only permissible means by which an offering of securities may be made. A final prospectus, including the information omitted from the
preliminary prospectus, must be distributed to each purchaser after the registration
statement ~as beco~e effect!ve. The ~egistration statement, which includes the prospectus, other mformation not mcluded m the prospectus, schedules supporting the financial statements, and exhibits, is on file as a public record at the SEC.
7. Section 11 of the act. Liability for misstatements or omissions may also arise under
§ 12(2) of the act and rule lOb-5 under the Exchange Act. 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (1964).
See generally 3 Loss 1699-1721, 1763-97.
8. Section 5(c) prohibits making an offer to sell a security before a registration
statement h~s been file~, or while it is subject to a stop order suspending its effectiveness, or while proceedings toward that end are pending. Section 5(a) prohibits the
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sections 3 and 4 of the act, is available. For analytical purposes it is
most useful to think in terms of the general applicability of section
5, subject only to the federal jurisdictional limitations, unless an exemption is available.
Registration under the act is, in reality, the registration of a
transaction in a security and not registration of the security itself.
Thus, even though a security was originally issued under an effective
registration statement or an applicable exemption, registration or
qualification for exemption may again be necessary for a later transaction.0 Since there is normally more than one person involved in
making the sale and since each participant on the selling side of the
transaction is deemed to be making the sale, each must have an exemption for his participation.10 The burden of establishing the
availability of an exemption rests upon the one claiming it. 11
The legislative purpose behind the registration requirement was
to protect the investing public through the disclosure and liabilities arising from registration for the distribution, but not the trading,
of securities. Congress, in focusing its attention on the distribution of
securities, drew no distinction between primary distributions by
issuers of securities and secondary distributions by controlling interests.12
Section 4(1) provides an exemption from these registration requirements for "transactions by any person other than an issuer, 13
underwriter, or dealer." Although an investor who sells an insubstantial amount of stock is such a person, his broker executing the
sale may be included within the term "dealer."14 However, the
broker's participation in such a transaction will normally be exsale or delivery of a security unless a registration statement is in effect. Section 5(b)
limits the form of an offer to sell a security to a preliminary prospectus meeting the
requirements of § IO and prohibits delivery of a security after sale unless accompanied
or preceded by a final prospectus meeting the requirements of § IO(a). In each case
the prohibition or limitation depends on use of the mails or facilities of interstate
commerce. All three of these subsections are directed to any person, and not merely
an issuer or one acting on behalf of an issuer. The term "prospectus" is defined in
§ 2(10) to include any written or broadcasted offer to sell a security or any confirmation
of a sale, subject to certain limited exceptions. See note 6 supra for the distinction
between a preliminary prospectus meeting the requirements of § IO(b) and a final
prospectus meeting the requirements of § IO(a).
9. This is distinguishable from registration under the Exchange .Act, wherein once
registered a security retains this status, regardless of whose hands it is in, until action
is taken to deregister the security.
IO. Ira Haupt &: Co., 23 S.E.C. 589 (1946).
11. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
12. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1933).
13. Section 2(4).
14. Section 2(12).
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empt under sections 4(3) or 4(4). 15 However, any transaction involving an underwriter does not come within the section 4(1) exemption.
Section 2(11) defines underwriter as follows:
"any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view
to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect
participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a
participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such
undertaking ....16 As used in this paragraph the term 'issuer'
shall include, in addition to an issuer, any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person
under direct or indirect common control with the issuer."
Thus, in addition to the requirement that a stockholder register the
distribution of any stock as to which he is an underwriter, section
2(11) requires him to register the distribution even if he is not an
undenvriter if he is a "controlling person" and the transaction involves an underwriter (which would include a broker executing a
transaction on his behalf).17 Consequently, it becomes critical to examine more thoroughly the definitions of "controlling persons" and
"underwriters."
II.

CONTROLLING PERSONS

A. The Tests
Although the Securities Act does not define "control" in concrete
terms, 18 two tests have been developed. Rule 405, under the act
states:
15. Prior to the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), §§ 4(1), 4(2), 4(3) comprised, respectively,
the first, second, and third clauses of § 4(1); section 4(4) was designated § 4(2). Section
4(3) exempts transactions by a dealer except those occurring prior to the expiration
of forty days (ninety days in the case of certain issuers) after (1) the first bona fide
offering of the security to the public (without registration and in violation), (2)
the effective date of a registration statement relating to the security, or (3) the public
offering of the security after the effective date of its registration statement, whichever
is later, excluding any time during which a stop order is in effect or stop order pro•
ceedings are pending, and except for an underwriter's unsold allotment. Section 4(4),
which is applicable notwithstanding the forty• or ninety-day period, exempts brokers'
transactions executed upon customers' orders on a stock exchange or in the over-thecounter market, but not the solicitation of such orders. The brokers' exemption has
been limited by certain rules defining solicitation which would make the exemption
unavailable. Both of these exemptions apply only to the broker's or dealer's participation in the sale and not to the customer. The latter must find his own exemption.
16. The omitted portion of § 2(11) and rule 141 under the Securities Act have the
effect of excluding from the definition of an underwriter selling group members whose
interest is limited to the customary distributors' or sellers' commission.
17. Stockholders selling on behalf of the issuer also come within § 2(11). See note
67 infra. The meanings of "purchased" and "distribution," as used in this section, are
examined in Part IlI infra.
18. Section 15 extends the liabilities of §§ 11 and 12 to: "Every person who, by

May 1965]

Federal Securities Act Registration

1143

"[T]he term 'control' (including the terms 'controlling,' 'controlled by' and 'under common control with') means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether
through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise."
While this rule purports to define terms for the purpose of the
registration forms, the terms defined are those used in section 2(11)
and the rule is given broad application. The second test-whether
the person or group is in a position to require the issuer to execute
and file a registration statement-has been developed by the courts.19
Although these tests are the paramount criteria in determining
control for the purpose of section 2(11), control should also be considered in the contexts of the Securities Act, Exchange Act,20 Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and Investment Company
Act of 1940.21 In each of the latter two acts, the control concept
or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connec•
tion with an agreement or understanding with one or more other persons by or
through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under section
11 or 12.•••" Compare the quantitative statutory tests cited in note 22 infra.
19. See SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(temporary injunction), 167 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (permanent injunction),
aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959). This test is entirely
rational and consistent with the legislative purpose of the act. Congress imposed the
registration and disclosure requirements upon distributions by issuers and those persons who, by reason of their control over issuers, were in a position to cause them
to undergo registration. See H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 12. It was recognized that
in many cases substantial amounts of stock were already outstanding in the hands
of a dominant stockholder or group and that the protections of the act should (and
could without undue restraint on alienation) extend to distributions by these persons
as well as by the issuer. Since only an issuer can execute and file a registration statement, Congress could not (without restricting the free alienation of securities) impose
both the formal registration requirements and the attendant disclosure concerning
the issuer upon persons who were in no position to procure registration. The Report
of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 569-70 (1963), recommends a requirement of limited disclosure of the terms of the offering by brokers making unregistered
secondary distributions.
20. Item 8 of the basic registration form, Form S-1, requires disclosure of parents,
defined in rule 405 as controlling persons of the issuer. Section 20 of the Exchange
Act imposes liability upon controlling persons comparable to that of § 15 of the
Securities Act. In addition, the Exchange Act registration forms and reports require
disclosure of controlling persons. Item 2 of Form 10 (the basic securities registration
form under the Exchange Act), Item 3 of Form 10-K (annual report for issuers under
the Exchange Act), Item 1 of Form 8-K (current report for issuers under the Exchange
Act). Control is also important in determining the integration of offerings by affiliates
to exceed the $300,000 limit of regulation A under the Securities Act. See rule 254 and
North Country Uranium &: Minerals Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 608 (1957), a comparable case
under the former Regulation D.
21. 49 Stat. 838, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1958) and 54 Stat. 789, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to -52 (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2, -6, -8, -39
(Supp. V, 1964), respectively.
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has a twofold purpose: (I) to determine those persons subject
to the act,22 and (2) to regulate or prohibit certain affiliations and
transactions between affiliated persons which may lack the characteristics of arms-length dealing.23 Both of these acts include a concept
of "controlling influence," in addition to the concept of control;
thus their scope is patently broader.24 The Trust Indenture Act of
193925 also bars an affiliated person, including one in a control
relationship to the issuer or underwriter, from acting as trustee
thereunder. 26
B. The Cases
The control concepts of the various acts differ in accordance with
their divergent legislative purposes, and these differences affect the
standards for determining control. Nonetheless, precedents under
one act will carry significant weight in resolving questions under the
others.27 A higher degree of control should be required under section 2(11) than is the case with most of the other control questions. 28
Since there are relatively few control cases under section 2(11), and
these do not fully define the scope of the term, the other cases must
be examined as well, bearing in mind their different purposes and
quantitative standards.
22. Sections 2(a)(7), (8), and (11) of the Holding Company Act define such terms
as "holding company," "subsidiary company," and "affiliate," for the purposes of
determining those persons who are subject to that act, partly in terms of the percentage of outstanding voting securities owned (ten per cent except for "affiliate" where
five per cent is the standard), but permit exclusion from these sections by the Commission upon a finding of lack of control. Section 2(a)(9) of the Investment Company
Act contains a rebuttable presumption of control based on ownership of more than
twenty-five per cent of voting securities. Section 3(b)(2) of the Investment Company
Act provides that an issuer who is primarily engaged in an operating as opposed to
an investing business through controlled companies may apply for exemption from
that act. Section 2.4 of The Illinois Securities Act of 1953, ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 121½,
§ 137.2-4 (1964), also defines control as including a person or group owning twentyfive per cent of the outstanding voting securities, where no other person owns a
larger percentage.
23. Sections IO(b)(l), 12, and 13 of the Holding Company Act; §§ 10 and 17
of the Investment Company Act.
24. Controlling influence has been held to involve something less than control.
Koppers United Co. v. SEC, 138 F.2d 577, 580-81 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Detroit Edison Co. v.
SEC, 119 F.2d 730, 739 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941); Chicago Corp., 28
S.E.C. 463 (1948); Transit Inv. Corp., 23 S.E.C. 415 (1946).
25. 53 Stat. 1149, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbb (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77ddd (Supp. V, 1964).
26. Section 310(b}(3), 53 Stat. 1159, 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(3) (1958). Section 310(b)(5)
contains various tests of ineligibility, based on conflict of interests and not expressly on
control, in terms of percentages of voting and other securities held.
27. M. A. Hanna Co., 10 S.E.C. 581, 589-90 (1941).
28. The ability to procure Securities Act registration is immaterial in at least two
of the three types of control cases: (1) those arising under the disclosure provisions
of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act and (2) the control or controlling influence
cases under the Holding Company Act and the Investment Company Act. Relations
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Control is a question of fact and is determined on a case-by-case
basis. It is seldom resolved by reference to a single fact, but by the
cumulative effect of all relevant facts. No quantitative rule can be
fashioned, and all that can be done is to outline the criteria which
have supported findings of control.

I. Stock Ownership
a. Attribution
The most obvious criterion of control is stock ownership, and it
would seem at first glance to be a quantitative one. First, however,
there is a question of whose stock should be included in making the
determination. The putative control person's ownership furnishes
only a starting point; to this should be added stock under his direct
control, such as by power of attorney, proxy, contract, or understanding.29 Next, family holdings have to be considered. Although
there are no formal attribution rules, stock held by family members,
particularly the immediate family, will probably, in the absence of
contrary indications, be attributed to him for this purpose.30
A voting trust would not ordinarily insulate the dominant beneficial owners of the depasited stock from a finding of control, particularly where the trustee either acts on the formal directions of
the beneficial owners or othenvise is not independent.31
b. Group Ownership
If the control person is a member of a cohesive group, the entire
group may be deemed in control if the relationship of the group
members to each other and to the issuer is sufficiently close. The
fact that a number of people act in concert to effect a distribution
has been recognized as a strong indication of a cohesive control
group. In SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 32 a control group
or transactions between an issuer and a person who does not satisfy either the rule
405 or the "ability to procure registration" tests could still lack the characteristics of
arms-length dealing (the target of these provisions) and a lower degree of control
would be the appropriate standard. However, in the third category-controlling persons'
liability under § 15 of the Securities Act and § 20 of the Exchange Act-at least the
rule 405 test should govern and the ability to procure registration should be present.
29. Thompson Ross Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111, 1119-21 (1940); Austin Silver Mining
Co., 3 S.E.C. 601 (1938); Canusa Gold Mines, Ltd., 2 S.E.C. 548, 555 (1937).
30. In J. P. Morgan & Co., 10 S.E.C. ll9 (1941), non-voting stock in an investment
banking firm (Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.) held by wives and adult children of officers
and directors of J. P. Morgan was one of the factors disqualifying that bank, under the
Trust Indenture Act, from acting as trustee in offerings in which Morgan Stanley acted
as underwriter. See also P.L.I. 8-9.
31. H. M. Byllesby & Co., 6 S.E.C. 639, 651 (1940).
32. 148 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (temporary injunction), 167 F. Supp. 716

1146

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 63:1139

of approximately thirty members was found to be making an unlawful distribution without registration. The court held that one of the
defendant dealers violated the act in purchasing stock for distribution from two of the control group members holding 1.5 per cent of
the outstanding stock.83 Similarly, a pool or escrow arrangement for
stock held by a group has supported a finding of concerted action
amounting to control. 84

c. Amount Held
Where the stock held by the control person or group exceeds
fifty per cent of the total outstanding, a finding of control will normally follow. 811 If, as is frequently the case, the amount held is less
than fifty per cent, how the balance of the outstanding stock is held
must also be considered. If the remaining shares are widely scattered
among many small stockholders, a much lower percentage holding
by the control person or group would be required for a finding of
control.86 It appears that ten per cent of the outstanding stock would
easily control many listed companies. Management frequently holds
a lower percentage, but its control is based largely on official position
and control of the proxy machinery, which in and of themselves are
strong positive control factors. 87 The firmness of the management's
control has been measured in part by the amount of proxies it
receives. 38 The percentage representation of a person or group at
stockholders' meetings is frequently higher than their percentage of
the total outstanding stock and this has also been considered a relevant factor. 89
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (permanent injunction), afj'd sub nom. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d
241 (2d Cir. 1959).
33. See also S. T. Jackson 8c Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4459, CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. ,I 76068 (1950).
34. Thompson Ross Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111 (1940). In Landay v. United States, 108
F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 681 (1940), a mail fraud and Securities
Act prosecution, the court found the defendants, who dominated the corporation
through a pooling of stock, to be issuers within § 2(4), without relying on the control
concept of § 2(11).
35. Compare Battery Sec. Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5592, Oct. 25,
1957, in which the president and nominal controlling stockholder was found not to
be in control when another person had contributed most of the capital and actually
ran the business.
36. American Gas 8c Elec. Co. v. SEC, 134 F.2d 633, 642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
319 U.S. 763 (1943); Chicago Corp., 28 S.E.C. 46 (1948); Transit Inv. Corp., 23 S.E.C.
415, 418-20 (1946); Automatic Tel. Dialer, Inc., 10 S.E.C. 698, 704 (1941).
37. Thompson Ross Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. llll, lll9-21 (1940).
38. Id. at 1120-21.
39. Chicago Corp., 28 S.E.C. 463, 474-77 (1948); Pacific Gas 8c Elec. Co., 10 S.E.C. 39
(1941), aff'd, 127 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1942), aff'd on rehearing by an equally divided court,
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The legislative history of section 2(11) suggests the inverse assumption that anyone disposing of a sufficient quantity of stock to warrant registration ought to be in a position to require it. 40 However,
the quantity of stock to be sold should not, by itself, establish control.41
d. Interrelation of Groups
The existence of a significant block of stock held by others is an
important, though not conclusive, factor. Whether it negates control
depends on the relationship of the two blocks to each other and to
management. 42 Stockholders at odds with management presumably
do not control, and inability to secure board of directors representation is a strong indication of the absence of control.43 However, these
facts may be difficult to establish.
If a control person or group shares management with representatives of another group, both may be in a control relationship to the
issuer. Cases under the Holding Company and Investment Company
Acts recognize that control may rest in more than one person at one
time, 44 although this situation would be more common under the
less rigorous tests of these acts. The fact that the non-management
block might not prevail in a proxy contest would not negate control, particularly when, because of harmonious relations, the likelihood of such a contest is remote. 45 The absence. of active intervention in management may indicate satisfaction and not the lack of
power to intervene.46 Since the power to control, as distinguished
139 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1943) (per curiam), affd by an equally divided court, 324 U.S.
826 (1945) (per curiam).
40. H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 12.
41. H.R. Doc. No. 95, supra note 19, at 562-66, discloses several large unregistered
secondary distributions through underwriters over the facilities of the New York Stock
Exchange, including: General Electric Company $12,000,000, Bethlehem Steel Corp.
$29,000,000, and Martin Co. $6,000,000. The absence of registration could only be
predicated on a lack of control by the selling stockholders. The size of the offering
must, therefore, be considered in relation to the quantity and aggregate market value
of the outstanding stock.
42. Koppers United Co. v. SEC, 138 F.2d 577, 580-81 (D.C. Cir. 1943); North Country
Uranium &: Minerals, Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 608, 610-13 (1957); Chicago Corp., 28 S.E.C. 463,
468 (1948).
43. Detroit Edison Co. v. SEC, 119 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1941); United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Allied Chem. &: Dye Corp., 5 S.E.C. 151 (1939).
Inability must be distinguished from abstention. See authorities cited notes 46 and
47 infra.
44. Chicago Corp., 28 S.E.C. 463 (1948); M. A. Hanna Co., 10 S.E.C. 581, 586 (1941).
45. Chicago Corp., supra note 44, at 474-75. Here the fact that the minority block
could prevent corporate action, either by direct vote or by breaking quorum, was considered a factor indicating controlling influence. Id. at 471-72, 476-77. This reasoning
should not apply to § 2(11), since affirmative control, not negative influence, is the test.
46. North Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 692 (1946).

1148

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 63:1139

from day-to-day management, constitutes control, latent power has
been equated to control.47
2.

Official Position

In the absence of a contrary indication, it is generally assumed
that any member of top management is in a control relationship to
the issuer. The group concept is pertinent here too, for if the individual in question is a member of a family or other group which
includes directors or officers, their positions will have a bearing on
his own.48 Managements are recognized as being normally harmonious and cohesive,49 and it would be unusual for an officer who is
among those who make the major corporate decisions not to be a
member of the control group. The same conclusion would not necessarily follow with respect to an outside director, particularly one who
did not have or represent substantial stockholdings. 5° For the nonmanagement person or group, board and executive committee representation51 and historic relationships through personnel ties or the
sponsorship and promotion of officers and directors have been given
some weight. 52
Lack of official position does not itself negate control. 53 Likewise,
47. Detroit Edison Co. v. SEC, 119 F.2d 730, 739 (6th Cir. 1941); Chicago Corp., 28
S.E.C. 463 (1948); Walston &: Co., 7 S.E.C. 937, 950-51 (1940); Reiter-Foster Oil Corp.,
6 S.E.C. 1028, 1044-46 (1940).
48. See P.L.I. 8-9, 21. Those closely related to a -member of management may be
deemed to be under his domination (or he under theirs) and, therefore, within the
control group. Of course, if the acts of the relative are in fact the acts of the control
person, they will be so regarded.
49. See Miller v. Hano, 8 F.R.D. 67 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (management as a group found
to be in control); S. T. Jackson &: Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4459,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,f 76068 (1950).
50. In Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927
(1959), a case decided under § l6(b) of the Exchange Act, the Court recognized the
noncontrolling position of an outside director. His status should depend largely on
the degree of participation in the issuer's affairs, such as by membership on key
committees of the board of directors.
51. Koppers United Co. v. SEC, 138 F.2d 577, 580-81 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Pacific Gas
&: Elec. Co. v. SEC, 127 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1942); Chicago Corp., 28 S.E.C. 463 (1948);
M. A. Hanna Co., IO S.E.C. 581, 588 (1941). See note 41 supra for cases on inability to
secure board representation. Executive committee membership takes on added significance when the directors meet infrequently. Resources Corp. Int'I, 7 S.E.C. 689,
716-18 (1940).
52. North Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 693 (1946); American Gas &: Elec. Co. v.
SEC, 134 F.2d 633, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Pacific Gas &: Elec. Co. v. SEC, supra note 51,
all decided under the Holding Company Act. See also Transit Inv. Corp., 23 S.E.C.
415, 418-20 (1946), in which controlling influence, within the Investment Company
Act's ban on transactions between affiliates, was found to rest in a bank president and
three per cent stockholder who, among other things, had the confidence of substantial
stock interests and who, together with his predecessor, had sponsored a majority of the
directors.
53. Nev-tab Oil &: Mining Co., 38 S.E.C. 497 (1958); North Country Uranium &:
Minerals Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 608, 610-13 (1957); Walston &: Co., 7 S.E.C. 937, 950-51 (1940).
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the relinquishment of position does not necessarily indicate loss of
control. 54 In Transit Investment Corp.,5 5 the Commission distinguished between position as the source of power and power as the
source of position. Applying this distinction to former directors and
officers or to the estates of deceased directors and officers, the termination of the official position which was the source of control would
mean termination of the control relationship. However, where the
position was not the source of power, control would presumably
continue. 1i6
3. Other Factors
The following factors have also contributed to a finding of control: handling the issuance of securities,57 past participation in
financing, 58 a significant financial stake in the issuer (without direct
ownership),59 speaking for management or handling publicity, 60 the
existence of a management contract or arrangement, 61 or a relationship to the issuer such as that of a major customer, supplier, or creditor.62 The historic nature and degree of permanence of these relationships would materially affect their significance.63 An organizer or
promoter, who presumably controlled the issuer at the outset, may
still be in control at a later date. 64 The absence of contrary indi54. When the Holding Company Act became effective, many holding companies
sought to divest themselves of the formal trappings of control over their affiliates.
However, the resignation of common directors and officers was found not to establish
the cessation of control or controlling influence, since the latent power remained.
American Gas &: Elec. Co. v. SEC, 134 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Pacific Gas &: Elec.
Co. v. SEC, 127 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1942); Detroit Edison Co. v. SEC, 119 F.2d 730 (6th
Cir. 1941).
55. 23 S.E.C. 415, 420 (1946).
56. This distinction is useful when one or the other of the situations is clearly
present; however, there is a large gray area in which the source of control cannot
be clearly defined.
57. Stadia Oil &: Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269, 275 (10th Cir. 1957);
Schamber v. Aaberg, 186 F. Supp. 52 (D. Colo. 1960); SEC v. Franklin Atlas Corp.,
154 F. Supp. 395, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Miller v. Hano, 8 F.R.D. 67 (E.D. Pa. 1947);
Reiter-Foster Oil Corp., 6 S.E.C. 1028, 1044-46 (1940).
58. American Gas &: Elec. Co. v. SEC, 134 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Morgan Stanley
&: Co. v. SEC, 126 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1942); Detroit Edison Co. v. SEC, 119 F.2d 730
(6th Cir. 1941); H. M. Byllesby &: Co., 6 S.E.C. 639, 652 (1940).
59. J. P. Morgan &: Co., IO S.E.C. 119 (1941); Walston &: Co., 7 S.E.C. 937, 950-51
(1940).
60. SEC v. Franklin Atlas Corp., 154 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Nev-tah Oil &:
Mining Co., 38 S.E.C. 497 (1958).
61. Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &: Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104, 123 (W.D.
Ark. 1949); M. A. Hanna Co., IO S.E.C. 581, 586 (1941).
62. Koppers United Co. v. SEC, 138 F.2d 577, 580·81 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Touche,
Niven, Bailey &: Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 662-67 (1957).
63. M. A. Hanna Co., IO S.E.C. 581, 589 (1941), and cases cited in note 58 supra.
64. Stadia Oil &: Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269, 275 (10th Cir. 1957); North
Country Uranium &: Minerals, Ltd, 37 S.E.C. 608, 610-13 (1957); Automatic Tel. Dialer,
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cations would permit the inference that control, once present,
continued.
Control should follow from evidence of overall domination. 615
Specific incidents in which the issuer or management has or has not
acceded to the wishes of the control person would be relevant,
though reliance on an insubstantial amount of disagreement would
be misplaced.66

III.

STATUTORY UNDERWRITERS

The definition of an underwriter in section 2(11) includes,
among others, any person who, with a view toward distribution, has
purchased from an issuer or control person. The question of whether
one comes within this definition most frequently arises in determining the availability of the section 4(1) exemption for a sale of securities received67 from the issuer without registration, usually in reliance upon the private offering exemption contained in section
4(2).68
Inc., IO S.E.C. 698, 704 (1941). See also J. P. Morgan &: Co., IO S.E.C. 119 (1941); M. A.
Hanna Co., supra note 63; cases cited in note 54 supra.
65. See, e.g., Schamber v. Aaberg, 186 F. Supp. 52 (D. Colo. 1960); Southeastern
Industrial Loan Co., IO S.E.C. 617, 632-33 (1941); Resources Corp. Int'l, 7 S.E.C. 689,
716-18 (1940); Thompson Ross Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111, 1119·20 (1940).
66. Under the Holding Company Act, those exercising controlling influence need
not always be able to carry their point or make their influence fully effective, Detroit
Edison Co. v. SEC, 119 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1941), so long as the management would
probably defer to their wishes on matters of importance. Koppers United Co. v. SEC,
138 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1943). But cf. United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). In the Schering Corp.-White Laboratories merger, the SEC acknowledged that rule 133, as then in effect, exempted the exchange of stock in a merger,
but it required registration prior to the sale of stock to be received by a trustee
who was a director and the largest stockholder of the acquired company. See Securities
Act Release No. 3846, October 8, 1957, and P.L.I. 10-11. Though he opposed the
merger, he was apparently unable to prevent it.
For further discussions of the control concept, see 2 Loss 764-83; Comment, .The
Meaning of "Control" in the Protection of Investors, 60 YALE L.J. 311 (1951). Many of
the numerous Holding Company Act control cases are cited in Loss and the above
cited comment, as well as in American Gas &: Elec. Co. v. SEC, 134 F.2d 633, 643 nn.
20, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1943), and M. A. Hanna Co., IO S.E.C. 581, 589-90, n.13 (1941).
67. Although § 2(11) uses the word "purchased," it is construed in the broadest
sense so as to be virtually synonymous with "received." The transfer of securities for
any valuable consideration comes within the definition of "sale" in § 2(3). Thus "purchase," which is not separately defined, should be equally broad. Persons selling
securities received from the issuer may also come within the other part of the § 2(ll)
definition as "selling for" the issuer whenever the transfer from the issuer is susceptible to being viewed as transparent. MacClain v. Bules, 275 F.2d 431, 436 (8th Cir.
1960); I Loss 642; note 94 infra.
68. " .•• transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering." As will be
seen, the same question may be present in the sale of stock received from the issuer
without registration in reliance upon other exemptions.
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A. Investment Intent Under the Private Offering Exemption
One of the requisites of the private offering exemption is that
the purchase be for investment and not with a view to distribution. 69 The requirements of this exemption would not be satisfied if
the purchaser came within the literal language of section 2(11). By
construction, however, only the purchaser who takes with the affirmative intent to hold for investment (rather than with the absence of
an intent to distribute) comes within the private offering exemption
and is excluded from the definition of an underwriter.
In the Commission's view, an intent to sell (1) after a predetermined event or lapse of time or (2) after an appreciation in value or
(3) in the event there is no such appreciation is not an investment intent. The purchaser must be prepared to weather normal investment risks such as changes in the economy and the financial condition, prospects, and even the type of business of the issuer.70
Investment intent is to be determined by reference to the time of
purchase. Like any intent question, it is determined by inference
from the tangible facts, probably the most significant of which is the
subsequent sale. Since the seller has the burden of demonstrating
investment intent,71 he must be able to establish that his subsequent
sale is consistent with this intent. There are three basic criteria for
measuring investment intent and its consistency with a subsequent
sale: (1) the seller's circumstances at the time of purchase (whether
consistent with a long-term commitment in the stock); (2) the time
lapse between the purchase and sale; and (3) the degree to which the
seller's circumstances have changed. The question will turn on the
combination of inferences to be drawn from these factors.

I. Circumstances at the Time of Purchase
A professional, such as a broker or investment banker, will ordinarily not be deemed by the SEC to have taken for investment; investment intent is inconsistent with the occupation of buying, selling,
and dealing in securities.72 Fiduciaries and institutional investors,
69. Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896
(1959); Securities Act Release No. 455!!, Nov. 6, 1962; 72 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 784 (1959). There
are important conditions to this exemption in addition to taking for investment. See
Securities Act Release No. 4552, supra, and 1 Loss 653-96.
70. Securities Act Release No. 4552, supra note 69; Securities Act Release No. 3825,
Aug. 12, 1957 (re The Crowell-Collier Publishing Company); P.L.I. !14-39.
71. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953); Gilligan, Will & Co. v.
SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1959); Securities Act Release No. 4552, supra note 69.
72. Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, supra note 71; Op. Gen. Counsel, Securities Act
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who are obliged constantly to review their portfolios and dispose of
investments which are no longer suitable, face the same problem, although to a lesser degree. 73
If the purchaser is an officer, director, or employee of the issuer,
this relationship would tend to show that he views the investment as
a long-term one. On the other hand, if the size of the investment is
substantial in relation to the purchaser's net current assets, it may
be inconsistent with a long-term commitment since the likelihood of
a forced liquidation would be increased; the fact that no particular
contingency requiring liquidation is foreseen does not alter the
possibility that some such contingency might arise.

2. Holding Period
The SEC recognizes no fixed time period between purchase and
sale as establishing an investment intent, although it does acknowledge that lapse of time is an important factor. 74 Until a few years ago,
a one-year rule of thumb had evolved among the securities law bar. 75
Beginning with the Crowell-Collier Release, 76 however, the SEC has
taken pains to negate any rule of thumb. In the Crowell-Collier Release and the Second Circuit's decision in the related case of Gilligan,
Will & Co. v. SEC,77 a ten-month holding period did not preclude a
finding of an intent to distribute. In United States v. Sherwood,78
the Court stated that the presence there of a two-year holding period
was "an insuperable obstacle" 79 to finding such intent. Sherwood,
however, was a criminal contempt case in which the Government
had the burden of establishing distributive intent beyond reasonable doubt. In the normal case, where the seller has the burden of
Release No. 1862, Dec. 14, 1938. Historically, the Commission has been reluctant to
accept investment representations from securities dealers. See Securities Act Release No.
4552, supra note 69; Securities Act Release No. 3210, April 9, 1947; I Loss 674 n.96;
P.L.I. 292-93.
73. See Securities Act Release No. 4552, supra note 69, at 4.
74. Id. at 3-4.
75. P.L.I. 29-31; Fooshee & McCabe, Private Placements-Resale of SecuritiesThe Crowell-Collier Case, 15 Bus. LAw. 72, 80 n.18 (1959). The SEC probably invited
this rule of thumb. See Op. Gen. Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 285, Jan. 24, 1935,
at 3; Securities Act Release No. 1862, supra note 72; 1 Loss 668, n.85. See Brooklyn
Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147, 162-63 (1935), indicating that interstate sales by
dealers after one year would not ordinarily vitiate the § 3(a)(ll) exemption for intrastate
offerings; 1 Loss 597. The rule of thumb probably also stemmed from the limitation
on the § 4(3) dealers' exemption which was originally one year. See note 15 supra.
76. Securities Act Release No. 3825, supra note 70. See also Securities Act Release
No. 4552, supra note 69, at 3; Securities Act Release No. 4248, July 14, 1960, at 6-7,
in which the Commission, in its proposed rule 155, declined to adopt any prima facie
holding period preceding the sale of underlying securities received upon conversion.
77. 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959).
78. 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
79. Id. at 483.
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establishing his investment intent by a preponderance of the evidence, the Sherwood case is of no precedent value.
Notwithstanding the lack of any fixed holding period or of any
reliable rule of thumb, the purchaser who gives an investment letter will usually inquire how long he must hold. 80 Since direct evidence of the seller's intent is rarely available, appearances will form
the basis for controlling inferences; the holding period will support
or negate an investment intent depending on the other two factors:
circumstances at the time of purchase and intervening changes in
circumstances. However, the weakness in relying on the holding
period lies not in an absence of probative value, because it clearly
is probative, but in the tendency to overemphasize it to the exclusion
of the other relevant factors. Since it is the most readily ascertainable fact, it is easy to forget that it is only one among several which
bear on the question.
If a rule of thumb may be propounded (which is open to serious
doubt), 81 the following is advanced. If the holding period is less than
two years, the inferences to be drawn from the other two factors must
negate a distributive intent in order for the sale to be consummated
·with reasonable safety; if the holding period is more than two years,
the inferences to be drawn from the other two factors must support
a distributive intent for the sale to be subject to serious risk. 82
There will be many cases in which the holding period will have
little or no weight.

3. Change of Circumstances
A change of circumstances subsequent to the purchase may permit a sale consistent with an investment intent at the time of purchase. However, several conditions must be met: (1) the change must
80. See text accompanying note 134 infra. In 1 Loss 671, the author wonders if, by
asking the question, the purchaser has not entertained the fatal thought. See the hypo•
thetical dialogue in Garrett, Federal Securities Act-An Introduction to Jurisdiction,
1961 U. ILL. L. F. 267, 293 n.85. Since, under § 2(ll), the only relevant intent is that at
the time of purchase, a subsequent decision to hold for investment would seem to be
irrelevant. The SEC has recognized, however, that the investment versus distribution
question is not necessarily determined at the time of initial purchase. See rule 152 and
Securities Act Release No. 4248, supra note 76.
81. Securities Act Release No. 4248 and other releases cited in note 76 supra;
Posner, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation, 18 Bus. LAw. 931, 936 (1963).
82. This amounts to converse rebuttable presumptions based on a two-year holding
period when the other factors are inconclusive. The writer can cite no authority for
this presumption, since United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959),
is not considered as standing for this proposition. The two-year undertaking in Form
S-14 has been cited as evidence that the SEC regards sales after two years as not
making the seller an underwriter. See note 145 infra and symposium cited therein.
However, it is more likely that the SEC, having imposed an obligation to file posteffective amendments, felt constrained to terminate the obligation after a specified
period.
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not have been reasonably foreseeable at the time of purchase; (2) it
must not have been initiated by the seller; (3) it must be outside the
scope of normal investment risk; 83 and (4) it must bear upon the commitment in the stock and prompt its liquidation. The SEC seems to
take the position that the change must render the sale necessary, and
not merely desirable or pru<lent, 84 although its necessity could indicate an overcommitment inconsistent with an original investment
intent, assuming the "foreseeability" that something "unforeseen"
may occur. On the other hand, a change of circumstances making a
sale desirable but not mandatory may be equally reconcilable with
a genuine long-term commitment.

B. Purchasers Under Other Exemptions
To this point, the discussion of statutory underwriters has been
limited to persons purchasing from an issuer pursuant to the private
offering exemption. The status of underwriter is not limited to this
situation; the section 2(11) definition reaches any purchaser from an
issuer, regardless of which exemption, if any, is relied upon. 85
Exemptions from registration are found in sections 3 and 4 of the
act and by operation of rule 133.86 The statutory arrangement is the
source of some confusion as section 3 purports to exempt certain
classes of securities while section 4 purports to exempt certain transactions. In fact, the exemptions contained in sections 3(a)(l) for pre1933 offerings, 3(a)(9) for exchanges with existing security holders,
3(a)(l0) for judicially or administratively approved exchanges, and
83. I Loss 670-72; P.L.I. 34-39. The Commission seems to be of the view that the
change must be in personal circumtances, as opposed to business circumstances such
as a merger, change of the issuer's business, or the termination of the purchaser's
employment with the issuer. It is arguable that changes in business circumstances are
more foreseeable, and thus more within the scope of investment risk, than are changes
in personal circumstances. So long as the distinction is not applied arbitrarily, there
is no harm in giving it weight. It is unreasonable to require an investor to take
subject to any and all changes in business circumstances, some of which may be so
dramatic and unforeseeable as to reverse the most genuine investment intent.
84. Securities Act Release No. 4552, supra note 69, at 4; I Loss 671-72.
85. The purchaser in a registered sale may also be an underwriter upon resale.
If so, full compliance with § 5 would require prospectus delivery (which may be a
problem if the resale is deferred, see Form S-14 undertaking described infra note
145) and the § 11 liabilities would apply to him.
86. There are other exemptions created by rule, but not pertinent to this discussion. Section 3(a) purports to exempt eleven classes of securities, all applicable to
sales by an issuer. Sections 3(b) and (c) authorize the Commission to exempt, by rule,
issues not exceeding $300,000 and those by small business investment companies. As
stated in Part I supra, § 4 consists of four exemptions, only one of which-the private
offering exemption-applies to the issuer. Rule 133 (sometimes called the "no sale"
rule) has the effect of exempting the issuance of securities in mergers, consolidations,
sales of assets, and recapitalizations, if certain conditions are met, by providing that
for the purpose of § 5 no sale is deemed to be involved.
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3(a)(ll) for intrastate offerings are transaction exemptions. They apply only to the issuance or exchange contemplated therein and not to
subsequent sales of the securities so issued. 87 Each of these exemptions is based on the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the
security, while the remaining section 3 exemptions are based on the
nature of either the issuer or the security.88
The rational basis for the exemption disappears after the initial
issuance under sections 3(a)(l), (9), (10), and (II), and, when its
rational basis disappears, the exemption itself logically falls. If an
exemption is construed as representing a determination that the protections of the act are not required in a given case89 and if a substitute for the investor protection afforded by registration is found in
the nature of the transaction, there is no reason why the exemption
should extend to a subsequent distribution. Therefore, the subsequent seller of securities issued under the section 3(a)(l), (9), (10),
or (11) exemptions, as well as anyone else participating in the sale,
must find his own exemption.90
An exchange of securities under section 3(a)(9) or (10) should
not alter the status of control persons or those who would be underwriters upon the sale of securities surrendered in the exchange.
87. W. H. Bell &: Co., 29 S.E.C. 709, 711-14 (1949); Ira Haupt &: Co., 23 S.E.C. 589,
599-600 (1946); Thompson Ross Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111, 1117-18 (1940); Securities Act
Release No. 4248, supra note 76, at 3-4. See 1 Loss 708-10.
88, The Commission has long acknowledged that the exemptions contained in
§§ 3(a)(2) (federal, state, and municipal issues), (3) (short-term notes, drafts, and bills),
(4) (securities of non-profit organizations), (5) (certain securities of building and loan,
homestead, and savings and loan associations), (6) (securities issued under § 20a of
the Interstate Commerce Act), (7) (court approved certificates issued by a receiver or
trustee in bankruptcy), and (8) (certain insurance or endowment policies or annuity
contracts) are truly exempt securities without regard to the transaction in which
they are issued or sold. See Thompson Ross Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111, 1118 (1940);
Securities Act Release No. 646 (Class C), Feb. 3, 1936. But see Securities Act Release
No. 4248, supra note 76, at 4-5 regarding convertible securities issued in a Chapter X
proceeding and note 89 infra regarding §§ 3(a)(6) and (7).
89. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); SEC v. American Int'! Sav. &:
Loan Ass'n, 199 F. Supp. 341 (D. Md. 1961). This reasoning could be extended to
negate the exemption for subsequent sales of securities issued under §§ 3(a)(6) and (7),
where a judicial or administrative determination of the fairness of the security and
the immediate issuance affords the substitute for registration. The subsequent sale
may be on different terms, and the security may have changed in the interim. In the
latter case, the rule of SEC v. Saphier, 1 SEC Jud. Dec. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) and Bankers
Union Life Co., 2 S.E.C. 63 (1937)-that § 3(a)(l) does not apply where there has
been a change in the security-could be invoked to terminate the exemption.
90. See Thompson Ross Sec. Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111, 1117-18 (1940), and Securities Act
Release No. 646 (Class C), supra note 88, regarding § 3(a)(9); Merger Mines Corp. v.
Grismer, 137 F.2d 335 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943), and compare the
unclear opinion in Shaw v. United States, 131 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1942), regarding
§ 3(a)(I0); authorities cited supra note 87 and infra note 92 regarding §§ 3(a)(l) and
(11). See generally Securities Act Release No. 4248, supra note 76. Section 3(a)(l) no
longer has any practical significance.
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These persons must attempt to come within another exemption for
the sale of the securities so received. Whether the purchaser becomes
an underwriter upon the sale of securities received in such a transaction depends on whether the sale is part of a distribution. 01
Another approach has been applied to cases arising under the
intrastate exemption of section 3(a)(ll), which requires that the security be "... part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident within a single State ...." This language has been construed
to mean that the securities must come to rest in the hands of investors resident within a single state. 92 The distribution is complete
when holders have taken for investment and not with a view to further distribution.
The obvious parallel between the concepts of coming to rest
under section 3(a)(ll) and being taken for investment under section
4(2) was recognized at an early date by the Commission. 08 Although
cases involving section 3(a)(ll) deal primarily with the availability
of the exemption in the first instance, the coming to rest theory is
susceptible to the broader application of testing the status (under
sections 4 and 2(ll)) of a seller of securities received pursuant to
other exemptions.
Prior to 1959, rule 133 applied the no sale theory to the issuance
of securities in certain mergers, acquisitions, and reorganizations,
but was silent on the status of subsequent sales by those receiving the
securities. In 1959, the rule was amended to add paragraphs (b)
through (f) which impose underwriter status, subject to certain exceptions, on (I) any person who distributes securities issued in the
transaction pursuant to any contract or arrangement and on (2) the
acquired corporation and controlling persons of the acquired corporation who receive the securities with a view to distribution.M
91. Those receiving an insubstantial amount of securities in one of these trans•
actions should not be deemed underwriters or engaged in a distribution, even if they
purchase with the intent to resell. As pointed out in I Loss 642-43, to hold otherwise
would virtually read § 3(a)(9) out of the act since no issuer could ever be certain of
the investment intent of all such purchasers. The same would be true for § 3(a)(I0).
The question may tum, in part, on whether the transaction was essentially public or
private. See Securities Act Release No. 4248, supra note 76, at 3-5. Although the discussion is of convertible and underlying securities, its rationale could apply to all
securities received in such transactions.
92. SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86 (D.N.H. 1958), a[J'd, 276 F.2d
665 (1st Cir. 1960); Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., I S.E.C. 147, 157-63 (1935);
Op. Gen. Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 4434, Dec. 6, 1961, at 3. Those participating in a distribution under § 3(a)(ll) are underwriters, and the § 4(1) exemption is
unavailable should the § 3(a)(ll) exemption fail.
93. Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., supra note 92; Securities Act Release No.
1459, May 29, 1937. See also Securities Act Release No. 4552, supra note 69, at 3.
94. These amendments were prompted by a series of cases in which the old rule
had been used as a device for publicly distributing securities without registration
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Here the exchange does not alter the status of control persons
of the acquired corporation or those who would have been under·writers upon the sale of the securities surre_ndered. Control persons
may make sales within the limits of paragraphs (d) and (e), if unaccompanied by the proscribed selling effort.95 Since the amount received in the rule 133 exchange is necessarily in proportion to the
amount held in the acquired corporation, purchasers other than
control persons and pre-exchange underwriters are unaffected by it
and may sell in reliance on section 4(1).96
C. Pledgees and Donees

Until the 1960 decision in SEC v. Guild Films Co.,97 it was commonly assumed that a bona fide pledge of securities did not involve
through effecting a merger followed by a planned distribution of the securities of
the surviving corporation by those receiving them in the transaction. SEC v. MicroMoisture Controls, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (temporary injunction), 167
F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (permanent injunction), afj'd sub nom. SEC v. Culpepper,
270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959); Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 683 (1957), afj'd,
256 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam); 1 Loss 518-42. It was recognized that the
distributing stockholders were mere conduits, and that, although there was no sale
by the issuer to them, there was a sale by them to the public on behalf of the issuer.
Hence, the sellers came within the other branch of § 2(11) by selling for an issuer, and
the sale was not exempt under § 4(1). This result was necessary to close a loophole
through which substantial amounts of unregistered securities were being distributed
to the public. The amended rule 133 applies underwriter status to, inter alia, controlling persons of the acquired corporation who receive the issuer's securities with
a view to distribution. 1 Loss 532-33 questions the inconsistency of an underwriter
purchasing from the issuer with a view to distribution when the issuer makes no sale.
However, the amended rule 133 must be recognized as a pragmatic solution which
perhaps does not satisfy technical nicety. Its effect is that, although no sale for the
purposes of § 5 occurs, a sale and purchase for the purpose of § 2(11) is involved.
As an alternative rationale, "purchased from" in § 2(11) may be read to mean "received
from." See discussion of the Schering Corporation-White Laboratories merger, supra
note 66, for another pre-1959 treatment of the problem. The Uniform Securities
Act follows the rule 133 approach by excluding this type of transaction from the
definition of sale. See § 40l(j)(6)(C). The subsequent resale would be exempt if it
qualified for one of the non-issuer exemptions.
95. The purpose of paragraphs (d) and (e) was to equate their positions with
that of controlling persons of the acquiring corporation and with their own before
the exchange. Securities Act Release No. 4248, supra note 76, at 7.
96. Although the Commission is understood to raise no objection to reliance on
rule 133 when one stockholder or a group dominates a publicly-held acquired corporation so as to control the vote, framing an acquisition of a closely held corporation
under rule 133 to secure the benefit of paragraphs (d) and (e) would seem ill-fated,
either because the dictum in Great Sweet Grass Oils Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 683, 691 (1957),
that the old rule 133 was not available where the requisite stockholder vote was a
mere formality, may have survived the amendments to the rule, or because the purchasers may be deemed underwriters upon even such limited sales.
97. 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960). See also Skiatron
Electronics &: Television Corp., 40 S.E.C. 236 (1960); 1 Loss 645-51. The sale upon
default by a bona fide pledgee is exempt under most blue sky laws. See, e.g., Uniform
Securities Act § 402(b)(7).
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a sale and that the pledgee would not be deemed an underwriter
upon his sale of the collateral after default. In Guild Films, stock of
a controlling person was pledged and promptly sold upon default of
the loan. The lower court based its decision that the sale violated
the act on its finding that the pledge was a sham.98 In the view of
the Second Circuit, however, bona fides is irrelevant under section
2(11) and a pledgee selling stock pledged by a control person after
default comes within that section. 99 Necessarily, the same conclusion
would follow for a pledge by the issuer.
Donees of stock from control persons have been deemed underwriters and a distribution by them has been held to require registration when it was reasonably foreseeable by the donor and donee. 100
Likewise, a donee who is the alter ego of or is selling for an issuer
or controlling person would be an underwriter. 101
D. The Meaning of "Distribution"
Heretofore, sales have not been distinguished from distributions,
and, as noted above, the legislative purpose of the Securities Act was
to apply the registration provisions to the distribution of, but not to
trading in, securities.102 Distribution has been described as "the entire process by which in the course of a public offering a block of
securities is dispersed and ultimately comes to rest in the hands of
the investing public."103 If the transaction in question is but an extension of, or a latter stage in, the original issuance, it is part of the
distribution and the seller may be an underwriter. 104 If the distribu98. SEC v. Guild Films Co., 178 F. Supp. 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
99. The SEC has supported the Guild Films result on two theories: (i) the pledgee
takes with an intent to distribute upon the occurrence of a future uncertain event
(default) which amounts to an intent to distribute, and (ii) the pledgee must account
to the pledger for the proceeds of the sale after the debt is discharged and is thus
selling for the pledger. Securities Act Release No. 4669, Feb. 17, 1964. On the serious
need for the clarification of the status of bona fide pledges, see I Loss 650·51; Pierce,
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Guild Films Co. Inc., 16 Bus. I.Aw. 603 (1961).
100. Letter of Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance, CCH FED. SEC, L.
REP. 1f 2165.88 (Aug. 8, 1962). In the cases discussed in this letter, the donees were
eleemosynary institutions, and a sale of the stock was necessary to accomplish the
purpose of the gift. See P.L.I. 32-33.
IOI. SEC v. Mono-Kearsarge Consol. Mining Co., 167 F. Supp. 248 (D, Utah 1958).
See also note 67 supra.
102. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1933). See text accompanying
note 12 supra.
103. Oklahoma-Texas Trust, 2 S.E.C. 764, 769 (1937), afj'd, 100 F.2d 888 (10th Cir.
1939). See also Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147, 160 (1935). Both of
these cases were decided under § 3(a)(ll).
104. SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (tem•
porary injunction), 167 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (permanent injunction), afj'd sub
nom. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959). See also authorities cited supra
note 87.
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tion is complete and if the proposed sale is a new and separate transaction, the exemptions of section 4(1) and section 4(3) or 4(4) should
be available, respectively, to the seller and his broker, unless the
seller is a controlling person of the issuer.
It seems clear that the term distribution is not limited to a single
transaction, but may occur in a series of transactions extending over
a period of time.105 The concept of deferred distribution forms the
basis for the treatment of privately placed convertible and underlying securities under rule 155.106 The question is one of intent and
purpose, and, if the goal is a distribution, the number of transactions
or period of time required to accomplish distribution is irrelevant.
The act and rules do not define distribution in quantitative
terms, except in rules 154 and 133(d) and (e). Under these rules, a
seller is not deemed to be engaged in a distribution, provided his
activities and those of his broker are limited as provided in these
rules, if the proposed sale, when added to all sales within the preceding six months, does not exceed one per cent of the issuer's outstanding stock for over-the-counter stocks and the lesser of one per
cent of the outstanding stock or the largest weekly volume of trading
within any one of the four preceding calendar weeks for listed stocks.
Although this test lends itself to broader application, it has not been
so applied.107
The test may represent nothing more than the Commission's
estimate of what the market can absorb without resort to the proscribed selling effort, and the essence of distribution is selling effort.
This view finds support in. the legislative distinction between trading on the one hand and distribution on the other and in the fact
that the presence of selling effort would mark a violation of rule 154
even though the quantitative limit were met; the quantitative limit
may be exceeded108 if there is no selling effort. If selling effort is
present in a rule 154 transaction, the broker loses his section 4(4)
exemption and comes within the terms of section 2(11) as a seller
for a control person.
But, if selling effort were the sole criterion, the quantitative test
and the exclusion of underwriters in rule 154 would be surplusage.
105. Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896
(1959); Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589 (1946); Securities Act Release No. 4552, supra
note 69, at 4-5.
106. See Securities Act Release No. 4248, supra note 76.
107. The Commission has stated that it "is not a guide for defining distributions
in contexts not covered by the rule." Securities Act Release No. 4669, supra note 99,
at 2.
108. Under the first sentence of paragraph (b) and the "without limiting the
generality of the foregoing" clause in the second sentence.
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Likewise, there is no logical reason why an undenvriter could not
sell within the foregoing limits if there is no selling effort. Before
the adoption of rule 154, the Commission recognized the possibility
of an unlawful distribution in an active market without selling
effort. 109
Distribution involves a public as opposed to a private offering; 110
but "distribution" and "public offering" are not synonymous terms.
Casual sales under section 4(1) by the normal investor or by the control person within the limits of rule 154 are public offerings, but not
distributions.
The issuer, lacking the section 4(1) exemption, is foreclosed from
casual selling. The purchaser under the private offering exemption
is precluded not only from making a distribution himself, but also
from making sales which may be deemed part of a distribution by
the issuer.m Those receiving securities under essentially private
section 3(a)(9), (10), or (11) transactions or apparent rule 133 transactions would seem to be in the same position. 112 The status of substantial purchasers in section 3(a)(9), (10), and (11) public transactions is not entirely clear. 113
A genuine casual sale by such a private purchaser which is not
a distribution itself or part of a distribution by his seller should be
exempt under section 4(1) because he is not an undenvriter upon
109. Ira Haupt 8: Co., 23 S.E.C. 589, 600·06 (1946).
llO. A genuine private offering involves no distribution. However, this term is
sharply limited by SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. ll9 (1953). Under authority
quoted with approval by the Court, 346 U.S. at 125 n.ll, a public offering could be
limited to a small group, even one person, if the class of offerees is not properly
restricted. By the same token, one share could be publicly offered to anyone in the
world, or to a smaller but still public class, willing to buy it.
lll. In this context, "purchased from ... with a view to .•. distribution" in
§ 2(ll) could include not only an intent by the purchaser to make a distribution,
but also an intent to be a part of a distribution by the issuer. The private purchaser
from a control person is in the same position. See note 131 infra.
ll2. This result could be reached on several theories: (1) the amount sold may
itself amount to a distribution; (2) by analogy to rule 155 (Securities Act Release
No. 4248, supra note 76, at 3-5); or (3) because they are essentially private placements
and should be so treated.
ll3. They lack a rule of thumb comparable to rule 133(d) and (e). Logically, a
§ 3(a)(9) exchange should not alter the previous status, and such purchasers should
be free to sell in reliance on § 4(1), within the limits of rule 154 if they are control
persons, unless they would have been underwriters upon the sale of the securities
surrendered. This conclusion finds support by analogy to the non-recognition of a
rule 133 exchange for Securities Act purposes, similar to the tax-free reorganization
treatment under § 368(a)(l) of the INT. REv. ConE OF 1954 and in Securities Act
Release No. 4248, supra note 76, at 3-5. However, if the intent to distribute was
present at the time of purchase, they come within the letter of § 2(ll). The position
of substantial purchasers in public § 3(a)(l0) transactions who may not have surrendered any securities in the exchange is unclear, although, like substantial purchasers under § 3(a)(ll), they appear to be foreclosed from casual sales unless the
securities first "come to rest."
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such a sale.114 However, since he has no rule of thumb to determine
when his sale, standing alone, may be considered a distribution,
and the activities of his seller and his fellow private purchasers may
be attributed to him, the private purchaser sells at his peril.
Thus the meaning of "distribution" is far from clear. It does require a public offering. For the control person, it seems to connote
both a selling effort and a quantity of securities sold. For the potential unden\Tl"iter selling effort does not seem to be a factor, but, unless distribution means different things when applied to different
people, quantity should be a factor even though not limited to the
quantity he himself sells. The recognition of the quantitative element of distribution present in other contexts has not been extended
to the undenmter.
E. "Hot Stock" v. "Free Stock"
Although a seller's status as a control person is unaffected by
which securities he sells, it is generally understood that his status as
an undenmter is limited to the particular stock received from the
issuer with a view to distribution. Thus a stockholder may be an
unden\Tl"iter as to one block of stock, but not as to another. This distinction receives tacit recognition in rule 154 by the unavailability
of that rule to the seller's broker where the control person "is an
undenmter in respect of the securities" being sold. 115 Since the presumed application of unden\Tl"iter status upon resale is restricted to
the specific stock received from the issuer for investment, a distinction has developed between what is popularly called "free" stock,
meaning that as to which the holder is not an undenvriter, and
"tainted" or "hot" stock, as to which the holder may be an underwriter upon resale. 116
114. This question was left open by the Second Circuit in Gilligan. Will &: Co.
v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1959). The SEC rejected the proposal that the
rule 133(d) and (e) rule of thumb be applied to private purchasers of convertible
securities under rule 155, partially on the ground that rule 133 assumes the existence
of an active trading market which is not necessarily present in a private placement.
Securities Act Release No. 4248, supra note 76, at 7.
115. Rule 154(a)(4).
116. The latter terms are also loosely applied when the holder is a control person,
or, in the broadest sense, where a sale may not be made without registration, regardless of the reason. The position of the control person and the underwriter are
different, the source of the "taint" in the former case arising from the status of the
holder (and applying to all securities held by him) and in the latter from the source
of the particular stock (and presumably applying only to that stock). Rule 154 applies
to the broker selling for the control person, but not for the underwriter; a lapse of time
and change of circumstances, other than his relationship with the issuer, ,might free
stock held by the latter, but not the former. Thus, too much looseness in the use
of these terms can lead to confusion. The terms "control" and "investment" stock,
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The distinction is supported by a fair readihg of section 2(11)
and was probably intended. However, section 2(11) is also susceptible
to the interpretation that one may be an underwriter without regard to the particular stock to which the intent to distribute relates
and that section 4(1) is unavailable in all cases to one who would be
an underwriter upon the distribution of any stock held by him. The
theory has been advanced that, since stock is fungible, an investment
representation ought not to relate to the particular block of stock
with respect to which it was given, but rather to the next block sold
thereafter up to the amount covered by the investment representation.117 This theory construes the investment representation as applying to an equivalent amount, rather than to the specific stock as
to which it was given.
To date, the fungibility theory has not received wide acceptance.
There are, however, two Commission decisions which do not limit
section 2(11) to the particular block of stock received under an investment representation, but instead hold that a purchaser receiving
stock while engaged in a distribution (of, at least to some extent,
different stock) is an underwriter.118
In any event, underwriter status should survive changes in the
security, such as by stock split or reclassification,119 or by the receipt
of a security of a different issuer under rule 133.
Since one who purchases from an issuer or control person with a
view to distribution is an underwriter, what then is the status of one
who purchases stock as to which his seller is an undenvriter? There
is nothing illogical in extending underwriter status to one who
knowingly takes stock from such a seller intending further distribution.120 In SEC v. Culpepper121 judgment was reserved on the
status of a purchaser who has no knowledge of the "taint." However,
relating to the control person and underwriter respectively, are more precise, but are
also subject to indiscriminate use.
117. P.L.I. 36-37. Presumably the theory would be limited to securities of the same
class.

118. Skiatron Electronics & Television Corp., 40 S.E.C. 236, 250 (1960); Lewisohn
Copper Corp., 38 S.E.C. 226, 237 (1958). This result is entirely rational where the
distributing purchaser could be said to be "selling for" the issuer, and is only slightly
less defensible where he is restoring his position in the stock through the private
purchase. The Commission is understood to apply this theory to the executive who
sells stock to provide funds for the exercise of stock options.
119. Securities Act Release No. 4162, Dec. 2, 1959, pt. 6, announcing the proposed
rule 155. The issuance of any new securities invo~ving a sale under § 2(3) would
normally be accomplished under § 3(a)(9), if available. See notes 91 and 113 supra.
120. Otherwise the purpose of the act could easily be frustrated by running the
stock through a nominee. This would amount to a direct sale by the issuer or control
person. MacClain v. Bules, 275 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1960).
121. 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959), affirming SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 148
F.Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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in United States v. Sherwood,122 the proposition that the "taint" follows stock in successive hands was rejected.123
IV. THE

EXTENT TO WHICH CONTROL PERSONS

AND UNDERWRITERS

ARE

LOCKED-IN

Subject to the further development of the fungibility theory or
the Skiatron and Lewisohn Copper cases, 12i one may be an underwriter as to one block of stock and not as to another. A control person may also be an underwriter as to some, or all, of his stock.125
When the control person and underwriter disabilities are both present, the more restrictive one governs. Each is precluded from making
a public distribution without registration, although for the underwriter it is the distribution or the intent to make it which causes the
preclusion. However, the limitations on the manner in which control persons or underwriters may deal in their stock do not end there.
Casual Sales. Within the limits of rule 154, the control person
may effect casual sales through normal brokerage transactions, provided he is not an underwriter as to the stock sold.126 In computing
the quantitative limits, the amount covered by the sell order is added
to all other sales made by or attributed to127 the control person
within the preceding six months. If this total does not exceed one
per cent of the issuer's outstanding stock (for over-the-counter stock)
or the lesser of that amount and the largest weekly volume of trading within any one of the four calendar weeks preceding the receipt
122. 175 F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
123. In Winter v. D. J. &: M. Inv. &: Constr. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1960),
the court declined to fix liability on anyone but the plaintiff's immediate seller, although the facts would allow a finding that each of the successive holders had full
knowledge of the "taint,'' participated in the ultimate distribution, and could have
been deemed an underwriter. In 1 Loss 642, the view is expressed that one who
knowingly purchases an insubstantial amount of stock from a control person should
not be treated as an underwriter, although he may come within § 2(11). See Securities
Act Release No. 4248, supra note 76, at 5-6, for the treatment of successive holders
under rule 155. Section 2(11) contains no express scienter requirement, but it should
be implicit; and one who does not know or who is not chargeable with knowledge
of the "taint" should not be deemed an underwriter. However, the purchaser of a
substantial amount of stock would seem to be under a duty to investigate.
124. Skiatron Electronics &: Television Corp., 40 S.E.C. 236 (1960); Lewisohn
Copper Corp., 38 S.E.C. 226 (1958).
125. Such as a top executive participating in a stock option or purchase plan, or
one joining the control group upon receipt of stock in a private offering.
126. Rule 154 merely defines the broker's exemption of § 4(4), and the seller
must find his own exemption. Where he is not an underwriter and the proscribed
selling effort is not present, the seller's part in the transaction is exempt under § 4(1).
The broker is under an obligation to inquire as to whether the seller is engaged in a
distribution or is an underwriter. Securities Act Release No. 4669, supra note 99.
127. Sales by persons affiliated with the control person or by their donees may
have to be included in determining the availability of the rule. Securities Act Release
No. 4669, id. at 2-3.
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of the sell order by the broker (for listed stock), the sale is not
deemed a distribution. 12s
The Commission has stated that rule 154 may not be relied upon
to make sales up to its limits in successive six-month periods, as such
conduct would be deemed a planned distribution in excess of the
rule's limits. 129 In determining the amount to be matched against
the one per cent or weekly volume of trading, all sales within the
preceding six months, including both registered and exempt sales,
must be counted. Where the weekly volume of trading is controlling,
there seems to be nothing to prevent the inclusion of sales on the
exchange by the control person during the preceding four weeks,
notwithstanding the "bootstrap" benefit derived. In over-the-counter
stocks, the one per cent limit may be remarkably generous and not
indicative of what the market can absorb in casual trading, when,
as is frequently the case, a large portion of the outstanding stock is
held by a number of control persons and the public trading market
is thin. But the lack of any method of measuring over-the-counter
volume seems to require this Iimit. 130
Under paragraphs (d) and (e) of rule 133, control persons of the
acquired company, who may also have become control persons of the
issuer, may take advantage of the "little rule 154" contained in those
paragraphs (but not both rule 133 and rule 154 in order to sell twice
the amount permitted), notwithstanding the fact that they would
otherwise be undenvriters upon such sales. There are no restrictions
upon the other recipients of stock in a rule 133 transaction. Likewise,
there are no restrictions on those receiving insubstantial amounts in
essentially public section 3(a)(9) and (10) transactions. Even under
the "coming to rest" requirement of section 3(a)(ll), casual trading
by insubstantial purchasers under this exemption should not be
deemed part of the original distribution.
Whether substantial purchasers in these section 3 transactions
may make casual sales is unclear, although it may depend in part on
whether the transaction was essentially public or private. As in the
case of purchasers under the private offering exemption, once they
would no longer be deemed undenvriters either through passage of
128. Cf. text accompanying note 107 supra. The quantitative limits of the rule arc
safe guidelines. As noted above, if the limits are exceeded by an insubstantial amount,
the sale could still be defensible as not amounting to a distribution. See note 108 supra.
129. Securities Act Release No. 4669, supra note 99, at 4.
130. See rule 154(a), (c), and (d) and Securities Act Release No. 4669, supra note
99, at 4-5, for the limitations on the conduct of both the broker and control person
in soliciting or inducing purchase orders in anticipation of the sale. Rule IOb-6 under
the Exchange Act may be applicable to the sale to preclude purchasing or bidding for
the stock by the control person or broker while the sales are being made, even if the
quantitative limits of rule 154 are met. Securities Act Release No. 4669, supra at 5 n.8.
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time or change of circumstances they should be free to make casual
sales. Meanwhile, they run the risk that their sales standing alone
may be deemed a distribution or a part of the issuer's distribution.
There is no safe rule of thumb as in rule 133(d) and (e) or the apparent recognition of a quantitative element in the term "distribution" as applied to insubstantial purchasers in section 3 transactions.
Private Placements. Control persons and undenvriters may make
private offerings in much the same manner as an issuer, 131 but with
one important qualification for the undenvriter. Unlike private offerings by issuers or control persons (which are usually judged standing alone), a private offering by an undenvriter must be judged in
the light of the original offering to him since his sale is deemed but
an extension or a part of the original offering. A private offering by
an undenvriter must be consistent with the exemption claimed by
his seller. In effect, the undenvriter's offerees will be considered part
of the original group of offerees.132
Gifts and Pledges. As noted in Part III, a gift or pledge may be
equated to a sale within section 2(11) on several alternate theories.
The "selling for" language of that section has been invoked by the
Commission as one of the two supports for the Guild Films result
and may also apply to a gift.133 This language is clearly applicable
when the selling donee or pledgee is the alter ego of the donor or
pledgor, or when, for other reasons, the gift or pledge is a sham.
The second basis for bringing gifts and pledges within section
2(11) arises when the sale by the donee or pledgee is reasonably contemplated by the parties. Because the Commission views a state of
mind which recognizes the possibility of an ultimate sale as an intent
to distribute and since the court of appeals in Guild Films viewed all
pledges as being in contemplation of default, any such transaction
by a control person or undenvriter in which the possibility of ultimate sale is present carries a degree of risk. Certainly all pledges by
such persons are open to question. The obligations of a control person-donor or undenvriter-donor, although not entirely clear, are
131. Technically, the exemption for the secondary private offering is not under
§ 4(2), which applies only to issuers, but under § 4(1); the substance of the exemption,

however, is the same. I Loss 653 n.43. There have been several recent "swap" or
"centennial" type funds prepared to take stock in exchange for their own shares on
this basis.
132. If other purchasers in the same private placement are also selling, knowledge
of this may be imputed to the particnlar underwriter and the exemption lost for
the entire transaction. Gilligan, Will &: Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1959),
affirming 38 S.E.C. 388, 393 (1958); Dempsey & Co., 38 S.E.C. 371, 376-77 (1958); Elliott
&: Co., 38 S.E.C. 381, 385 (1958) (all related cases); Fooshee & McCabe, Private Placements-Resale of Securities-The Crowell-Collier Case, 15 Bus. LAW. 72 (1959).
133. See note 99 supra and text accompanying note 101.
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probably parallel to those of the private offeror in that such persons
must see to it that no disposition by the donee is contemplated.

Customary Restrictions and Procedures in Unregistered Sales.
When an issuer intends to rely on the private offering exemption,
the custom has developed of obtaining an "investment letter" from
the purchaser representing that he is taking the securities for investment and not with a view to distribution.134 As an additional precaution, a restrictive legend giving notice of the possible unlawfulness
of a sale without registration is frequently placed on the stock certificate and a stop transfer placed against the certificate with the
transfer agent. 135 Once the possible unlawfulness of a sale comes to
light, some documentation such as representations of fact, an opinion of counsel, or a "no action letter" will normally be required by
either the purchaser, broker, or transfer agent before the sale is
executed.186
The Chief Counsel of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, which administers the Securities Act, will on request furnish
interpretative advice on proposed transactions. When such advice is
favorable, it is referred to as a "no action letter." 137 The "no action
letter" is, however, a very limited remedy. First, it is not a final determination by the Commission, although as a practical matter
the letter would be rescinded in only the most unusual cases; it
does not foreclose a private suit under section 12(1) in which the
claimed exemption would be open to attack. Second, the "no action
letter" procedure is not a fact-finding forum. When a no action
request involves factual determinations-which is the case where
the question involves the absence of control or the consistency
of a sale with an investment intent-the letter will be issued only
in the most obvious cases and then only on the basis of the facts as
represented. Thus, in these two areas, in which most of the ques134. A short form investment letter was condemned in the Crowell-Collier Release,
Securities Act Release No. 3825, Aug. 12, 1957. Since that time, a longer form of letter
spelling out some of the elements of what SEC regards as a true investment intent
has been in vogue. See, e.g., P.L.I. 27-28. The language in this form, to the effect that
the purchaser has the right to dispose of his property when and as he sees fit, is open
to question. See Advanced Research Associates, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 4630,
Aug. 16, 1963, at 10, 19-20; Posner, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation,
19 Bus. LAW. 593, 596 (1964).
135. Securities Act Release No. 4552, Nov. 6, 1962, at 3; Symposium-Current
Problems of Securities Underwriters and Dealers, 18 Bus. LAw. 27, 85-89, 97 (1962).
136. See Securities Act Release Nos. 3825 &: 4552, supra notes 134, 135, and Pomer,
Developments in Federal Securities Regulation, 18 Bus. LAw. 931, 936-37 (1963), regarding counsel's obligations in giving such opinions.
137. The term stems from the usual conclusion of a favorable letter, that the
Division will not recommend any action to the Commission if the proposed transaction
is consummated. See P.L.I. 15-18, .126-131, for hypothetical examples.
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tions arise, a "no action letter" may be expected only where the legality of the sale is so clear that the letter is not needed.
There are two instances in which a request for such a letter is
warranted: when another party to the transaction insists on it, or
when the exemption turns on a question of legal interpretation as
to which the Commission's position is not clear.
Although the formal restrictions spotlight the question of
whether a stockholder is free to sell, the question may be present
even where the restrictions are absent. The formalities are only evidence of investment intent and not a substitute for it. Any unregistered disposition by a potential control person or unden\Tl"iter involves the determination first of status and second of the availability
of an exemption. Most often, the consistency of the disposition with
an earlier investment intent is an issue. Those connected with a
transaction cannot evade their responsibilities to make these difficult, yet necessary, determinations through the "no action letter"
procedure.
Registration as a Solution. Frequently, registration will be required to effect a contemplated disposition; 138 but even registration
is not always a satisfactory solution. Registration solely for a secondary offering may raise an ultra vires question. 130 Only the issuer
may undergo registration, and it involves expense and the assumption of certain liabilities. The selling stockholders might, however, reimburse the issuer for all or a portion of the expenses.140
There may be proposed sales which are large enough to require registration, but too small to justify the expense-which is largely fixed
1!18. Secondary offerings may be accomplished through regulation A; however,
the annual dollar limit is reduced in such cases from $300,000 to $100,000. See rule
254(a).
139. A closely held corporation could, however, receive a very real benefit from a
registered secondary in the creation of a market for its stock to assist it in future
acquisitions or in employee stock purchase or option plans. Purchasers of stock directly
from an issuer sometimes obtain commitments to register at their request, particularly
in mergers or acquisitions involving the issuance of stock; registration pursuant to such
a commitment should also be free from attack as ultra vires. Unanimous stockholder
consent is sometimes sought to avoid this question.
140. Indemnity insurance may also be obtained to protect the issuer and others
incurring Securities Act liabilities. Until a few years ago, the SEC refused to
accelerate the effectiveness of a registration statement, a procedural device which
effectively barred a firm commitment underwriting, unless the selling stockholders
paid the expense of registration or their proportionate share if the issuer was also
registering stock. See 1 Loss 279. Although the Commission no longer takes this
position, failure of the selling stockholders to pay their way may raise some blue sky
problems. See, e.g., California (where prospectus clearance must be obtained for
secondary offerings); Regulation § 357, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. ,r 8615 (1963). Registration
also involves expenditure of substantial time by personnel of the issuer, for which
reimbursement is not feasible.
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and does not vary significantly with the size of the offering-regardless of who bears it. ui
There are issuers for whom registration would be difficult if not
impossible. Although the SEC makes no qualitative appraisal of a
security in the course of registration, 142 the disclosure problems of a
company in precarious financial condition may be virtually insurmountable.143
If registration must be effected, the most satisfactory results are
obtained by making a substantial offering through an underwriting
group. Participation of professional undenvriters, while not a formal
prerequisite to registration, will generally mean a more expeditious
distribution of the stock and, at the same time, will eliminate some
problems in the registration process, which is geared to formal undenvritings.144
The last sentence of section 6(a) of the act provides that a registration statement shall be effective only as to securities intended to
be sold. This language is interpreted as precluding registration "for
the shelf," that is, registration of a block of stock without any present intent to sell it. Thus the obvious solution for the absence of an
exemption-that of registering the stock in question and thereafter
being free to sell whenever desired-runs afoul of this provision.
But the SEC does not take an inflexible position against shelf registrations145 and will permit such a registration if coupled with both
an undertaking to deregister any stock remaining unsold after some
fixed period of time and certain restrictions as to market activity and
141. See note 4 supra.
142. This is unlike many blue sky authorities who are authorized or required to
make such an appraisal before permitting sales within their jurisdictions or who are
authorized to issue a stop order if an offering is inequitable or would tend to work a
fraud. See e.g., Uniform Securities Act § 306(a)(E); CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 25507; Illinois
Securities Act of 1953, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121½, § 137.5C(4) (Supp. 1964), § 137.ll(H)
(1960).
143. Form S-1 requires three years' certified profit and loss statements. Forms S-2
and S-3, for certain companies in the development stage meeting specified conditions,
contain less rigorous requirements for financial statements. Aside from the financial
statements, disclosure problems can be so thorny as to discourage such an issuer from
undergoing registration.
144. There are presently two basic types of underwriting arrangements, firm commitment and best efforts. In the former, the underwriters make a firm commitment
to purchase the securities from the issuer or selling stock.holder, subject to limited
outs, and promptly offer the securities to the public. In the latter, the underwriters
act as agents for the issuer or selling stock.holder, but make no commitment to sell
any specified amount of securities.
145. Form S-14 is a type of shelf registration and requires an undertaking by the
registrant to file .post effective amendments containing a then current prospectus, for
a period of twenty-four months after the effective date of the registration statement,
prior to a sale by any recipient of the securities covered by the original registration
statement who could then be an underwriter. See Symposium, supra note 135, at 64-69.
The SEC has also permitted other types of shelf registrations for a limited period, in
which the prospectus may have to be updated by post effective amendment.
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stabilization.146 Thus, although shelf registration is possible, it is the
least satisfactory solution for the locked-in stockholder.

V.

CONCLUSION

Clarification is needed both with respect to who is a control person or underwriter and when the status, particularly in the latter
case, terminates. This is necessary so that those cases in which the
purposes of the act are not served by requiring registration may be
eliminated. The harshness of the present statute weighs heaviest on
the underwriter, since the control person may avail himself of rule
154. That casual sales by an undenvriter should and could be permitted consistently with the purpose of the act seems clear.
If a quantitative element were generally recognized in the term
"distribution" as used in section 2(11), those who would be underwriters upon a distribution could make casual sales in reliance on
section 4(1). The only remaining task would be to fix the point at
which a casual sale ends and a distribution begins. This relief might
be achieved by a rule of thumb similar to that contained in rule 154
or by some other refinement of the term "distribution." Selling effort could be controlled as it is in rule 154. If limited to publicly
traded stock, the SEC's argument against casual trading by an underwriter147 evaporates.
In view of the recommendations of the Special Study, 148 three
categories of transactions might be recognized in addition to existing
exemptions: (I) casual sales unaccompanied by special compensation or selling effort, in which no action would be required; (2) distributions, other than by an issuer or control person, in which special
compensation or selling effort is involved, requiring the limited
disclosure of the terms of the offering recommended by the Special
Study; and (3) distributions by an issuer or control person, requiring
full registration. If the first two categories were limited to publicly
traded securities such as those of issuers subject to the Exchange Act
reporting requirements, the definitions of control persons and under146. Because a shelf registration necessarily involves an offering at a price related
to the market price at the time of sale, those participating in such a distribution may
not stabilize by over allotment or the entry of bids to support the market during the
distribution, as permitted in a formal underwriting within the limits of rules IOb-6
and l0b-7 under the Exchange Act, and they must agree to stay out of the market
during the distribution and otherwise to comply with rule l0b-6. See Hazel Bishop,
Inc., Securities Act Release No. 4371, June 7, 1961, at 19-20, and Securities Act Release
No. 4401, Aug. 3, 1961, regarding the applicability of rule lOb-6 and other problems
in an uncontrolled distribution.
147. See note 114 supra.
148. Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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writers could be narrowed substantially. Investors would still receive
substantially the same protection presently afforded them, but without the unnecessary burden on control persons and underwriters
inherent in the present system. This need is heightened by the fact
that registration is so frequently an inadequate solution to the investor's plight.
This change would require a quantitative definition of distribution and a delineation of selling effort. However, rule 154 readily
lends itself to this application. A more difficult problem would be a
redefinition of "underwriter" to exclude all except those who are directly participating in a distribution by the issuer or control person.
Although section 2(11) points generally in this direction, the shotgun
approach in its interpretation has hit more than the target.
The difference in treatment between publicly traded securities
and those which are not publicly traded rests on several grounds.
Sales of the former, whether through formal underwriting arrangements or otherwise, are necessarily keyed to an existing market. Similarly, a substantial amount of information, although admittedly not
as much or in as accessible form as information contained in a prospectus, is normally available through annual reports to stockholders
and financial manuals.149 The purchaser of the unseasoned security
issued by the little known venture is in greatest need of the protections of the act.
Meanwhile, it remains difficult to explain to a client why he cannot make even casual sales of publicly held stock on the open market
without registration and prospectus delivery, when the financial
press daily reports sales to an undetermined number of purchasers,
none of whom received a prospectus. Since it is the purchaser whom
the act seeks to protect, the source of his shares should not determine
whether he receives these protections, unless the terms of the sale
itself depart from usual market transactions.150
149. This would bring the Securities Act closer to the typical blue sky law, under
which listed securities are usually exempt (e.g., Uniform Securities Act § 402(a)(8)),
and sales of those listed in financial manuals are exempt transactions if sold either
in non-issuer transactions (e.g., Uniform Act § 402(b)(2)) or, subject to certain conditions, by registered dealers (e.g., Illinois Securities Act of 1953 § 4F, ILL. REY. STAT,
ch. 121½, § 137.4F (Supp. 1964)).
150. A similar anomaly exists in the dealer's obligation to deliver a prospectus
under § 4(3), which seems to depend on the particular shares sold, both during the
forty and ninety day periods (see 1 Loss 256-59) and thereafter while he has an unsold allotment.
For another discussion of sales by control persons and statutory underwriters, with
particular emphasis on holders of convertible securities and warrants, see Hill, Rule
154 Under the Securities Act of 1933 and Related Problems-A Proposed Solution, 20
Bus. LAW, 335 (1965).

